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NOTES
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN INDIANA AND THE
PROPOSED UNIFORM ACT
During the last half-century there has been a movement to reform
and popularize the use of commercial arbitration.1 Since 1920, fifteen
states2 and the Federal Government' have passed statutes which grant
arbitration greater utility. In August, 1955, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws gave final approval4 to a draft
of a uniform arbitration statute.5 These recent developments focus at-
tention on a valuable alternative means for settling commercial disputes
which largely circumvents the problems of crowded court dockets. To
evaluate the Uniform Arbitration Act and clarify some of the problems
it seeks to solve, a reappraisal of the status of this long recognized,6 but
seldom used, remedy in Indiana seems desirable.
Indiana recognizes arbitration in two forms: common law and statu-
tory.' Both forms are interdependent, as the statute is cumulative to the
common law.' Although in any one arbitration the parties must elect be-
tween the two types,9 both may be discussed here together, as much of the
case law applies to arbitration generally.
1. See, KELLOR, AMERI CAN ARBITRATI N 169-180 (1948).
2. Arizona (1929), ARIz. CODE ANN. § 27-309 (1939); California (1927), CAL.
CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1280 (1949) ; Connecticut (1929), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8151 (1949) ;
Louisiana (1928), LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:4201 (1950); Massachusetts (1925), MASS.
ANN. LAWS c. 251, § 14 (1933) ; Michigan (1941), MIcH. ComP. LAWS § 645.1 (1948) ;
New Hampshire (1929), N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 541, § 1 (1955); New Jersey (1923),
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-1 (1952); New York (1920), N.Y. Civ. PRoc. ACT § 1448
(1955); Ohio (1931), OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (Page 1953); Oregon (1925;,
ORE. REv. STAT. § 33.220 (1953); Pennsylvania (1928), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 161
(1930) ; Rhode Island (1929), R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 475, § 1 (1938) ; Washington (1943),
WASH. REv. CODE § 7.04.010 (1951); Wisconsin (1931), Wis. STAT. § 298.01 (1953).
3. 43 STAT. 883-886 (1925), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1952).
4. The first draft received consideration in August, 1954. Under the rules of the
Conference, it must be considered at one more meeting. Pirsig, Toward a Uniforz
Arbitration Act, 9 ARn. J. (n.s.) 115.
5. "Act relating to arbitration and to make uniform the law with reference thereto."
The draft of this act was adopted by the National Conference of the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws on August 20, 1955, and approved by the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association August 26, 1955. Section 23 of the act authorizes the
short title "Uniform Arbitration Act."
6. The earliest case reported in Indiana is Mills v. Conner, 1 Blackf. 7 (1818).
7. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-201-226 (Bums 1946). This statute was passed in basically
its present form in 1852.
8. Kelley v. Adams, 120 Ind. 340, 343, 22 N.E. 317 (1889) ; Webb v. Zeller, 70 Ind.
408, 410 (1880) ; Miller v. Goodwine, 29 Ind. 46, 47 (1867).
9. When the parties have provided that the submission be made a rule of court,
the arbitration is statutory. Hawes v. Coombs, 34 Ind. 445 (1870). But after making
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A quasi-judicial remedy,1" arbitration begins with a voluntary agree-
ment between the parties." By this agreement, or submission, 2 the parties
to a dispute bind themselves to settle their controversy by arbitration.
The submission delineates the area of the dispute, determines the number
of arbitrators and the method of their selection, and the process by which
they are to reach their conclusion." The submission confers jurisdiction
over the subject of the arbitration on the arbitrators and empowers them
to conclusively decide all questions of law or fact relevant to the dispute."
Whether the arbitration is statutory or common law depends upon the
submission." A common law submission may be oral.'" Under the statute
the submission must be in writing and must provide that it is to be made
a rule of a designated court.' Although at common law it is optional
whether the parties give mutual bonds to carry out the arbitration,"8 the
statute makes bonding mandatory."
the election the parties must pursue the chosen course unless there is a mutual agreement
to deviate. Francis v. Ames, 14 Ind. 251 (1860).
10. KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN ACTION, 3-4 (1941) distinguishes arbitration as a
remedy from such methods of adjustment of differences as conciliation, mediation, and
negotiation. Emphasis is placed on the distinction that arbitration is a quasi-judicial
remedy which binds the parties to a result which may or may not be satisfactory in all
respects to one of the parties.
11. Apparently the only exception to the general rule that the arbitration is depen-
dent on a mutual agreement between the parties is the Pennsylvania arbitration statute.
Under the provisions of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 21 (1953), one party to a civil suit may
compel the other party to arbitrate and forego litigation of the dispute. This statute, by
amendment in 1861, is excepted from application to the city and county of Philadelphia,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 146.
12. A submission is an agreement by which parties contract to refer an existing
dispute to arbitration. It is to be differentiated from other agreements to arbitrate which
encompass disputes which may arise in the future. For a general discussion of arbitration
agreements, see KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN ACTION, 51-66 (1941).
13. See, Kile v. Chapin, 9 Ind. 150 (1857) ; Cones v. Vanosdol, 4 Ind. 248 (1853);
Shively v. Knoblock, 8 Ind. App. 433, 35 N.E. 1028 (1893).
14. Goodwine v. Miller, 32 Ind. 419 (1869).
15. Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 58 Ind. 254 (1877); Goodwine v. Miller, 32 Ind. 419
(1869) ; Hays v. Miller, 12 Ind. 187 (1859); Titus v. Scantling, 4 Blackf. 89 (1835).
See note 6, supra.
16. Kelley v. Adams, 120 Ind. 340, 343, 22 N.E. 317 (1889); Miller v. Goodwine,
29 Ind. 46 (1867) ; Carson v. Earlywine, 14 Ind. 256 (1860) ; Griggs v. Seeley, 8 Ind. 264
(1856).
17. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-201 (Burns 1946). Estep v. Larsh, 16 Ind. 82 (1861);
Fargo v. Reighard, 13 Ind. App. 39, 39 N.E. 888, 41 N.E. 74 (1895). The submission
may not, however, be made a rule of court in a justice of the peace court, Richards
v. Reed, 39 Ind. 330 (1872).
18. It was the practice to give bonds even in common-law arbitration. For a
discussion of the extensive use of arbitration bonds in common-law arbitration and their
utility in a suit on the award, see Steers, Arbitration at Conzwn Law in Indiana, 5 IND.
L.J. 175, 180-182 (1929).
19. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-203 (Burns 1946). The section provides that when an
agreement is made under statute, the parties must execute bonds to perform the award.
The bond must specify the names of the arbitrators, the dispute, and an agreement to
make the submission a rule of court.
NOTES
Any person qualified to contract may enter into a submission to
arbitrate.2' A person not a party to the submission may not be bound
by an award,2 but he may benefit from an award if contemplated in the
submission.22
The subject-matter of the arbitration at common law may be prac-
tically any type of dispute or controversy.2 Even a disagreement which
is not a legal cause of action can be submitted.24 The statute, however,
limits statutory submission to existing disputes25 which might be the sub-
ject of a law suit but do not involve ,a claim to a freehold interest in land.20
At common law, an agreement whereby the parties bind themselves to
submit a future dispute to arbitration is not illegal,27 but an award ren-
dered thereunder is not conclusive on the parties if the agreement pur-
ports to "oust the courts of jurisdiction." 2 Because disputes must be
existing before a statutory submission may be made, the statute perpetu-
ates the common law limitation. At least a partial circumvention of this
restriction may be accomplished by the use of a "condition precedent"
clause in a contract. 9 However, the use of such clauses has been limited,
20. Webb v. Zeller, 70 Ind. 408, 410 (1880); Titus v. Scantling, 4 Blackf. 89, 91
(1835). The Indiana statute excepted married women until amended in 1939.
21. Nor may one partner bind his co-partner by submission of a partnership matter
without his assent and, although the submitting partner is bound to perform the award,
the award does not thereafter bar a joint action by the firm grounded in the cause of
action covered by the award. Woody v. Pickard, 8 Blackf. 55 (1846).
22. Scearce v. Scearce, 7 Ind. 286 (1855).
23. However, it is a general rule that matters which are criminal, or whose determi-
nation is considered intrinsically a matter of public policy such as divorce actions, cannot
be the subject of arbitration. While there are not cases dealing with this issue in
Indiana and the statute is silent on this point, other jurisdictions have refused to hold
such matters arbitrable. Thus, courts have refused enforcement of awards based 'on an
illegal contract or transaction. See, Joe Lee Ltd. v. Lord Dalmony, [1927] 1 Ch. ,Div.
300; Metro Plan, Inc. v. Miscione, 257 App. Div. 652, 15 N.Y.S. 2d 35 (New York 1939).
24. An honest difference of opinion may be submitted by the parties. "[N]or indeed
is it necessary that they should have come to the actual point of dispute, for a matter
simply in doubt may be submitted." Milhollin v. Milhollin, 71 Ind. App. 477, 480, '125
N.E. 217 (1919).
25. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-201 (Burns 1946).
26. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-202 (Burns 1946).
27. The Supreme Council of the Order of Chosen Friends v. Forsinger, 125 Ind. 52,
55, 25 N.E. 129 (1890) ; Maitland v. Reed, 37 Ind. App. 469, 77 N.E. 290 (1905).
28. It was held that, with reference to existing disputes, the parties were presumed
to intend the award as conclusive, Rice v. Loomis, 28 Ind. 399 (1867). But where an
agreement was made to refer future disputes to arbitration, the award was treated as
only prima facie conclusive and the court could review the facts. The Supreme Cotincil
of the Order of Chosen Friends v. Forsinger, 125 Ind. 52, 59, 25 N.E. 129 (1890). See
text, p. 406, infra.
29. In such a contract there is a provision that in the event a dispute should arise
between the parties concerning the performance of the contract, arbitration shall be
resorted to for settlement of the dispute and the making of an award shall be a condition
precedent to any suit upon the contract.
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and enforcement might well be restricted to certain types of agreements."
The parties to a common law arbitration may revoke their submis-
sion at any time prior to the rendering of an award.3' Consequently a
party to a submission may wait until the end of the hearings and revoke
if he feels the award will go against him. The arbitration bond at one
time discouraged a revocation in a common law arbitration, but now
parties may revoke with impunity, rendering such arbitration relatively
uncertain of result." Although the statute does not expressly prohibit
revocation, it has been interpreted to prohibit revocation except by con-
sent of the court.33
The selection of the arbitrators, the place of the hearings, the rules,
if any, by which such hearings are to be governed, and the duration of
arbitration are determined by the agreement between the parties. The
30. The use of such clauses is believed to be common in construction contracts
where the engineer or architect is named as appraiser or arbitrator of any dispute which
may arise between owner and builder. Indiana has enforced such provisions and has
accorded to them special distinction: "[A] provision in a building contract by which
an architect or engineer becomes the arbitrator is, if anything, more binding than an
ordinary submission to arbitration for the reason that it becomes a part of the consider-
ation of the contract." Lake Michigan Water Company v. U.S. Fidelity, etc., Co., 70
Ind. App. 537, 542, 123 N.E. 703 (1919). This suggestion that the arbitration clause
is part of the consideration of the contract as a whole runs counter to recent decisions
holding that the promises to arbitrate are collateral to and separate from the remainder of
the contract. See, Nussbaum, The "Separability Doctrie" in Ainerican and Foreign
Arbitration, 17 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rlv. 609 (1940); Heyman v. Darwins, Ltd., [19421 A.C.
356, 366; Batter Bldg. Materials Co. v. Kirshner, 142 Conn. , 110 A.2d 464 (1954).
For an indication that Indiana will not go to extremes to enforce such an agreement,
See Munk v. Kanzler, 26 Ind. App. 105, 58 N.E. 543 (1900).
31. Grand Rapids, & I.R. Co. v. Jaqua, 66 Ind. App. 113, 115 N.E. 73 (1917). Even
though the submission expressly states that the agreement is irrevocable, a common law
submission may be revoked, Heritage v. State ex rel. Crim, 43 Ind. App. 595, 88 N.E.
114 (1908). However, a written submission cannot be revoked by parol, Shroyer v. Bash,
57 Ind. 349 (1877) ; Mand v. Patterson, 19 Ind. App. 619, 49 N.E. 974 (1897).
32. This uncertainty stems from the notion that the arbitrators were agents of the
parties and thus subject to revocation of their authority. Today few support the logic or
utility of this concept, but it has -become so embedded in the matrix of the common law
that it is virtually indestructible except through legislation.
Damages cannot be measured unless the award has been rendered, and therefore
the injured party is confined to nominal damages, Bash v. Christian, 77 Ind. 290 (1881).
Before the advent of the principle of quantum damnificatus, when the penal sum of the
bond was recoverable if there was a breach, the effectiveness of the bond stood on quite
a different footing. Consequently the rule of revocation developed at a time when it
did not work the iniquity which it does today. Once an award has been confirmed, suit
on the bond may be maintained for the amount of the judgment confirming the award,
interest, and costs. Shroyer v. Bash, 57 Ind. 349 (1877); Miller v. Hays, 26 Ind. 380
(1866).
33. A suit pending in court was referred by rule of court to arbitration. A subse-
quent attempt to revoke the submission was declared ineffective. Heritage v. State ex rel.
Crim. 43 Ind. App. 595, 88,N.E. 114 (1908). The court interpreted the statute to mean
that once made a rule of court the submission could be revoked only with consent of the
court. No criterion for granting consent is set forth in the instant case nor in the
statute, and no subsequent case has dealt with the point.
NOTES
arbitrators in a statutory arbitration must fulfill certain requirements
before proceeding with the hearings,34 and may subpoena witnesses and
evidence.3 During the hearings they are not bound by legal rules of
evidence, but may not capriciously refuse to hear relevant evidence intro-
duced by the parties."6 At common law and under the statute, all the
arbitrators must be present at the hearings." If the submission is silent,
a decision must be unanimous at common law," but in a statutory arbi-
tration, if the submission does not otherwise provide, a majority award
is valid." Partiality in an arbitrator, if known to a party while he may
still revoke the submission, may be waived.4" During the course of the
hearings, demonstrations of bias toward one party may be grounds for
invalidating the award."- Under the common law and the statute, the
arbitrators conduct the hearings subject only to the requirements that
they allow opportunity to both parties to support their allegations.42 The
arbitrators are functi officio when they reach their award and may not
thereafter reopen the hearings to correct or modify the award.43
The award can be oral in a common law arbitration;44 the statute
34. See, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-207 (Bums 1946).
35. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-207 (Burns 1946). The arbitrators must procure subpoenas
to be issued through a justice of the peace.
36. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-208, § 3-216 (Bums 1946). The misconduct of the arbi-
trator in rejecting evidence must be affirmatively shown. Russell v. Smith, 87 Ind. 457
(1882); Milner v. Noel, 43 Ind. 324 (1873).
37. See, IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-208 (Burns 1946) ; Heritage v. State ex rel. Crim.
43, Ind. App. 595, 88 N.E. 114 (1908). But see, Grand Rapids & I.R. Co. v. Jaqua, 66
Ind. App. 113, 115 N.E. 73 (1917), where the court stated that the rule only was intended
to prevent a majority of arbitrators from secretly meeting and precluding participation
by the minority in the hearings. The submission also may provide that in case of disagree-
ment the arbitrators may resort to an umpire for a decision, in which case the umpire
alone may render the award, Sanford v. Wood, 49 Ind. 165 (1874) ; Cones v. Vanosdol,
4 Ind. 248 (1853).
38. Byard v. Harkrider, 108 Ind. 376, 9 N.E. 294 (1886); Baker v. Farmbrough,
43 Ind. 240 (1873).
39. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-208 (Bums 1946).
40. Indiana Ins. Co. v. Brehm, 88 Ind. 578 (1883).
41. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-216 (Burns 1946). Robinson v. Shanks, 118 Ind. 125, 20
N.E. 713 (1888).
42. Baltes v. Bass Foundry & Machine Works, 129 Ind. 185, 28 N.E. 319 (1891);
Goodwine v. Miller, 32 Ind. 419 (1869) ; The Indiana Central Rwy. Co. v. Bradley, 7 Ind.
49 (1855). It is in this area that delay may ensue due to failure to provide for rules under
which the hearings are to be conducted. For suggestions relevant to inclusion of pro-
visions which expedite the hearings, See KELLOR, ARBITRATION Ix AcTIoN, 83-96 (1941).
A poorly conducted arbitration not only results in wasted time but may also lead to
commission of errors sufficient to provide grounds for vacating the award.
43. Baltes v. Bass Foundry & Machine Works, 129 Ind. 185, 28 N.E. 319 (1891);
Mand v. Patterson, 19 Ind. App. 619, 49 N.E. 974 (1897).
44. Kelley v. Adams, 120 Ind. 340, 22 N.E. 317 (1889) ; Forqueron v. Van Meter,
9 Ind. 270 (1857).
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provides that it must be written and a true copy delivered to the parties.45
It must state the decision of the arbitrator in terms sufficient to make its
meaning clear and may provide for money damages or that an act be
performed.46 The court may correct or invalidate an award which con-
tains a patent mistake." The award is subject to invalidation if it de-
cides questions not covered by the submission."
As an award is presumed to conclude all questions of law or fact
covered by the submission, it may be pleaded in bar of an action based
on the same dispute.4" An award may not be attacked collaterally," nor
may the invalidation of an award be appealed. 5 A statutory award may
be enforced by a suit on the bond or a suit on the award, but only after
the award is confirmed in accordance with the statutory provisions.5 -
Although jury trial may be had in a suit upon a common law award, the
statute provides otherwise.5 The narrow statutory grounds for upset-
ting an award are aimed at establishing certainty of fair hearings and are
not so much concerned with the substantive content of the award.54
Indiana, then, has declared that it favors the process of arbitration,
and accords to an award the status of a judgment of a court.55 Arbitra-
tion in common law form is subject to the disadvantage of revocability.
Through statutory arbitrtation has overcome this disadvantage, it is lim-
ited in application to existing disputes. With the exception of the treat-
ment of certain contracts which have provided that arbitration and award
shall be a condition precedent to any suit upon the contract, Indiana has
supported the "ouster" rule. In this respect, Indiana has not given to
arbitration the complete recognition afforded by leading commercial
jurisdictions.
45. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-209 (Burns 1946) provides that the award must be writ-
ten, signed by the arbitrators making the award, and attested 'by a witness. The award
is void under IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-211 (Burns 1946) unless a copy is delivered to the
party or at his residence within 15 days after signature. Flatter v. McDermott, 15 Ind.
389 (1860) ; Conrad v. Johnson, 25 Ind. 487 (1865).
46. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-219 (Burns 1946).
47. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-217 (Burns 1946).
48. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-216 (Burns 1946). However, where the award may be
limited without affecting the merits of the decisions on the matters actually submitted,
the court may modify the award under Ind. Ann. Stat. § 3-217 (Burns 1946). Deford v.
Deford, 116 Ind. 523, 19 N.E. 530 (1888) ; McCulloch v. McCulloch, 12 Ind. 487 (1859).
49. Walters v. Hutchins, 29 Ind. 136 (1867) ; Brown v. Perry, 14 Ind. 32 (1859).
50. Rice v. Loomis, 28 Ind. 399 (1867).
51. Smith v. Long, 43 Ind. App. 668, 88 N.E. 356 (1908).
52. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-214 (Bums 1946).
53. IND. ANN STAT. § 3-215, § 3-218 (Burns 1946); Spencer v. Curtis, 57 Ind.
221 (1877).
54. See, IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-216 (Burns 1946).
55. Smith v. Stewart, 5 Ind. 220 (1854) ; Fargo v. Reighard, 13 Ind. App. 39, 39
N.E. 888 (1895).
NOTES
The Uniform Arbitration Act, 6 by validating all written agree-
ments to submit existing disputes to arbitration and all future disputes
clauses in contracts, " is a basic departure from the Indiana position. The
act makes such agreements irrevocable except upon such grounds as
exist in law or equity for the revocation of any contract."8 Under the
act, there is no requirement to file the submission in court at the inception
of the arbitral process, nor to post bond. When a valid agreement to arbi-
trate is proven, the court is given the power to order arbitration.59 If a
party refuses to appoint arbitrators and the agreement does not cover
this situation, arbitrators may be appointed by the court.6"
When the agreement does not fix the procedure of the hearings, the
act provides for notice to the parties and conduct of the hearing at the
discretion of the arbitrators.6 The parties may not waive the right to
counsel prior to the hearings62 and the arbitrators may not refuse to allow
cross-examination of witnesses nor presentation of material evidence.6"
The arbitrators are to have the power to subjoena witnesses and evidence.64
Should an arbitrator cease to act during the hearing, the remaining arbi-
trators may continue to a determination of the controversy. 5 Unlike the
Indiana act, specific provision is made for an ex parte hearing when one
party refuses to appear.66
The award may be rendered by a majority of the arbitrators, the
agreement not otherwise providing.67 However, the arbitrators are not
necessarily functi officio after the award is rendered, but may resume
their status to modify or correct an award.6" The court may also modify
56. Hereafter cited as UAA.
57. UAA § 1.
58. Ibid.
59. UAA § 2(a) provides "[T]he court shall order the parties to proceed with
arbitration, but if the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate,
the Court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall
order arbitration if found for the moving party, otherwise, the aplication shall be denied."
60. UAA § 3.
61. UAA § 5.
62. UAA § 6.
63. UAA § 5 (b).
64. UAA § 7. This section makes it optional on the adopting state whether to
grant this power directly to the arbitrators or to require them to work through the
medium of the court.
65. UAA § 5(c).
66. UAA § 5 (a).
67. UAA § 4.
68. UAA § 9. This power may be exercised upon application of a party made
within twenty days of the delivery of the award to the party. Not all awards may be so
corrected, but only those in which there was an evident miscalculation of figures or
an imperfection of form not affecting the merits of the controversy. Such a pro-
vision is in keeping with the expectations of the parties and relieves the court from
making such a correction or, in the alternative, invalidating the award.
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or correct an award under the act after such powers of the arbitrators
have lapsed. 9
Under the act, courts are given broad power to enforce the arbitral
process.7" Concomitantly they have lost substantially all jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the controversy involved. Provision is made for
appellate review of certain orders of the court relevant to the arbitration
proceeding,7' but, in keeping with the act's goal of enforcing arbitration
agreements, no appeal may be taken from an order directing arbitration.
2
The Uniform Arbitration Act enforces agreements to arbitrate dis-
putes which may thereafter arise between parties, a policy to which In-
diana is not committed. Treatment of the future disputes clause under
the Uniform Act runs counter to a long line of decisions" which stem
from Vynior's Case74 where the common law rule was stated by Lord
Coke in dictum to be that a party could not, by an agreement entered into
before the nature of the dispute was known, be precluded from a judicial
determination of his controversy. The rationale for the rule was given
in a later case: Parties were not, by private agreement, competent to
"oust the courts of jurisdiction."7 The rule does violence to the intent
of the parties as of the time they entered into the agreement. It seems
to be based on an unspoken premise that arbitration will lead to an unfair
result to one of the parties, while a judicial determination would preclude
such an outcome. The rule has been criticized as having been originated
by mistake in that Coke's dictum was contrary to earlier precedent.' Its
69. UAA § 13. The power of the court under UAA § 13 to modify an award are
identical to those presently given by IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-217 (Burns 1946). The grounds
on which a court may vacate an award are generally the same under UAA § 12(a) (1-7),
and IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-216 (Burns 1946), except that under UAA § 12(a) (3) an
award "contrary to public policy" is additionally a ground for vacating. Under UAA
§ 12(a) (3) the court may, in its discretion, order a rehearing before the same, or other,
arbitrators. If the ground for vacating was the lack of a valid agreement to arbitrate, the
court may not, of course, order further arbitration.
70. This is characteristic of the more modern arbitration acts passed by the juris-
dictions listed in notes 2, 3, supra.
71. UAA § 19(a) (1-6). Appeals may be taken from orders of the court denying
application for: (1) an order to arbitrate, (2) an order granting stay of arbitration,
(3) an order confirming or denying an award, (4) an order modifying an award,
(5) an order vacating an award withouf directing a rehearing, (6) a judgment entered
on an award.
72. This is in contrast to the present Indiana position which does not allow an
appeal where the court vacates an award. The Indiana view is that an award is not a
final judgment until confirmed and that since appeals can only be taken from a final
judgment the vacating of an award may never be appealed. Smith v. Long, 43 Ind. App.
668, 88 N.E. 356 (1908).
73. See, COHEN, COMEIciAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW, 227 (1918).
74. 4 COKE, PART VIII, 80 (1609).
75. Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wills 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1746).
76. Cohen, op. cit. supra note 73, 103-127. Contra, Sayre, Development of Com-
inercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L. J. 595 (1928).
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NOTES
origin has been laid to a pecuniary motive on the part of judges, whose
income under a fee system was dependent on maintaining their jurisdic-
tion.77 Furthermore, the proliferation of the "ouster" rule is due in part
to the oracular sweep of the phrase, rather than to concrete considerations
of public policy."
Defenders of the rule urge that it provides a safeguard against un-
witting preclusion from the protection of the courts and that the inclusion
of future disputes clauses in "take it or leave it" form contracts might
result in an unwilling arbitration forced on a party who did not desire to
arbitrate the particular dispute.7 Doubtless this could happen. But in
any contractual relationship one party is likely to occupy a position en-
abling him to insist on provisions not desirable to the other party. The
weaker party may insist on a limited clause when he desires only certain
types of disputes arbitrated. If there is a real fear that a party should
be protected from unwittingly consenting to arbitration, a statute may
provide that arbitration clauses should be signed separately or occupy a
prominent position in the contract.8"
Under the Uniform Act and the other modern acts, arbitration is
specifically enforceable. Coercive enforcement of this voluntary process
has been advanced as being contrary to the spirit of the process.8 ' How-
ever, contracts are normally voluntary undertakings which have behind
them the coercive power of the state. Whereas the breach of a contract
can be compensated for in damages, an arbitration agreement, where
damages are uncertain, demands specific performance; this is the only
way to enforce the intent of the parties as it existed when the parties
were not swayed by considerations engendered by the heat of the dispute.
No remedy is an unfailing panacea. Arbitration can become, on oc-
casions, time-consuming and expensive," as can any remedy when the
77. See, Park Construction Co. v. Independent School District, 209 Minn. 182, 296
N.W. 475 (1941); United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum,
222 Fed. 1006 (D.C.N.Y. 1915).
78. "Perhaps the true explanation is the hypnotic power of the phrase, 'oust the
jurisdiction.' Give a bad dogma a good name and its bite may become as bad as its bark."
Frank, J., in Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2d
Cir. 1942).
79. See, Phillips, The Paradox itn Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Applied to
a Voluntary Proceeding 46 HAav. L. R. 1258 (1932-33).
80. In Rhode Island, the arbitration statute provides that a future disputes clause
is valid when contained in a separate paragraph immediately before the testimonium
clause or the signature of the parties. R. I. GEN LAws, c. 475 § 1 (1938). As this statute
is singularly unique, this fear is apparently not widespread.
81. See, Phillips, op. cit. supra in note 79.
82. See, Electrical Research Products v. Vitaphone Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 417, 171 A.
738 (1934), where sixty-two hearings were held and the combined expenses to the parties
totaled more than $750,000.00 without an award being reached.
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issues are many and complex. Arbitration may result in compromise
rather than clear-cut decisions, but this is more likely to be due to the
selection of partisan arbitrators, rather than any intrinsic fault of the
process. Effectiveness of arbitration is .dependent on the selection of
counsel and arbitrators by the parties. Faulty selection may result in
injustice, as faulty selection of a counsel or of a jury may also result in
a poor trial.
Objection might be made to arbitration because it fails to follow
the principle of stare decisis. However, the arbitrators are concerned with
the settlement of the particular controversy, and not with making law
for the future. Arbitration has as its virtue the fact that parties may
have a decision based on the flexible practices within a particular trade
or industry, unhampered by the encrustrations of earlier, perhaps out-
moded, decisions.83 However, though arbitrators are not bound by the
law, it does not follow that they will ignore it. It is recommended that
lawyers be selected as arbitrators when the issues in dispute are primarily
legal.84 Also, counsel for parties would be remiss if they did not argue
legal issues applicable to the dispute.
To the parties and their lawyers, arbitration offers the advantage
of a private settlement of a dispute before judges of their own choosing.
The selection of experts in the field of the dispute often effects a saving
of time and money to the parties because the expanded scope of judicial
notice may eliminate the need for much expert testimony.8" Moreover,
when expert testimony is required it can be readily understood and eval-
uated by the arbitrators. The expediency and finality of arbitration com-
mends itself to the businessman, who desires early resumption of normal
commercial relations, and to the lawyer, to whom time means money. "
83. Stare decisis lends stability to the law and makes it predictable. CGARozo, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51-64 (1952). However, on occasions its bonds
restrict development of the law. In fields other than arbitration, judges have squirmed
uneasily while following precedent: "If the question were new in this state, speaking
for myself I should not hesitate to reject the English rule as wrong in principle.
In re Gray's Estate, 147 Pa. St. 67, 74, 23 A. 205 (1892) ; ". . . I think that the effect
of it is to defeat the testator's intention . . . but it is a rule by which I am undoubtedly
bound." In re Dunster [1909] 1 Gb. 103, 105. Both these cases dealt with the problem
of lapsed residuary legacies, and the rule that a lapsed share could not pass to the
remaining residuary legatees but had to pass by intestacy to the next of kin. As in the
"ouster" situation, the repeated cry that "there can be no residue of a residue" fulfills
in auricular impact what it lacks in utility and logic.
84. See, Grossman, Arbitration and the Lawyer, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 510 (1939);
Popkin, Practical Problems Confronting the Practicing Lawyer, 17 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoB. 652 (1952).
85. See, Robb, Arbitration Procedure Compared With Court Litigation in Patent
Controversies, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679 (1952).
86. "[P]arties are now represented in 77 percent of their arbitrations by legal
counsel . . ." KELLOR, AMERIcAx ARBITRATION 171 (1948).
NOTES
Increased use of arbitration in recent years has apparently resulted
in satisfactory results, judging from the relatively few appeals from de-
cisions of the arbitrators." Paradoxically, the experience of one industry
suggests that industry-wide adoption of this remedy has resulted in a
reduction in arbitral settlements over the course of years, the parties ap-
parently relying more and more on voluntary adjustments with conse-
quently fewer interruptions of commercial intercourse.88
Adoption of a statute recognizing future dispute agreements pro-
motes utilization of arbitration. Widespread adoption of a uniform arbi-
tration act would also result in uniform enforcement of arbitration clauses.
The classification of arbitration as procedural has resulted in the appli-
cation of lex fori."9 Consequently, the party to such an agreement who
resides in a state which does not enforce future dispute clauses may com-
pel a party who resides in a future dispute jurisdiction to arbitrate, but
he may not himself be compelled unless by terms of the agreement, or
otherwise, jurisdiction can be acquired over him in the latter type of
jurisdiction."0 Because of its limited application, the Federal Arbitration
Act has not materially improved this fundamentally inequitable situa-
tion. 1 Understandably, extensive use of the future dispute agreement is
hampered when parties from different jurisdictions are dealing with each
other.
The experience of the states which have adopted statutes that en-
force future disputes agreements has apparently resulted in no disillusion-
ment. The Uniform Act effectuates arbitration in accordance with the
terms of the agreement between the parties and seeks to forestall failure
of the process where the parties have not provided for certain contingen-
cies. It is believed that the considerations in favor of stimulating the
use of the remedy of arbitration and making it more readily available
for the settlement of disputes outweigh any objections against enforce-
ment of future disputes clauses. Though, like any remedy, arbitration
may be misused and produce occasional undesirable results, its basic
utility demands encouragement.
87. In arbitrations held under the Rules of the American Arbitration Association
only 6% have been attacked in court, and in only 1% were the attacks sustained. KELLOR,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION 65 (1948).
88. Id. at 119-21.
89. See, Stern, The Conflict of Laws in Commercial Arbitration, 17 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PRoB. 567 (1952).
90. See, Phillips, Arbitration and Conflict of Laws: A Study of Benevolent Com-
pulsion, 19 CoRN. L. Q. (1934).
91. See, Sturges and Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration
Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 580, 585-598 (1952).
